Abstract-The outsourcing computations in distributed environments suffer from the trust problems between the outsourcer and the workers. All existing solutions only assume the rational lazybut-honest workers. In this paper, we first introduce the rational lazy-and-partially-dishonest workers in the outsourcing computation model. In addition, we propose a new fair conditional payment scheme for outsourcing computation that is only based on traditional electronic cash systems. The proposed construction uses a semitrusted third party to achieve the fairness and efficiency. However, is only involved in the protocol in the exceptional case, namely in the case of disputes. Moreover, since neither the secret sharing/splitting scheme nor the cut-and-choose protocol is used for the generation or verification of the payment token, our solution clearly outperforms the existing schemes in terms of efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
OMPUTATIONALLY expensive tasks that can be parallelized are most efficiently completed by distributing the computation among a large number of processors. For example, the sieving for factoring a 768-bit RSA modulus took almost two years on many hundreds of machines. However, on a single core 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron processor with 2 GB RAM, sieving would have taken about fifteen hundred years [30] . Due to the rapid growth of the Internet, it is possible to invite any computer to participate in a distributed computation task. By far, plenty of large distributed computing projects, such as the search for prime numbers (GIMPS, PrimeGrid), the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI@home), climate forecast (Climateprediction.net), and protein folding (FOLDING@home), have already successfully taken advantages of the power of Internet computations.
Generally, such distributed computations can deploy the so-called "outsourcing paradigm" to accomplish the tasks efficiently. Informally, an outsourcer that has a computation job decomposes the computation tasks into smaller ones and assigns them to multiple volunteer workers. Each worker completes the corresponding parts of the job and sends the result to the outsourcer. Specifically, we consider the following computation model: A job takes as a function and requires the evaluation of for all values in . An outsourcer partitions the domain into subsets and then allocates , and a value to a worker . computes for all and return those such that . pays if and only if indeed completes its job before the deadline.
The above model for distributed outsourcing computations has two security problems. Firstly, in a commercial setting where the pay for volunteer workers is proportional to their contribution, there is much incentive for workers to minimize the amount of their work in order to retrieve the full payments. Thus, does not trust that will do the whole job that he/she undertakes, i.e., to compute for every . Secondly, since could be any entity of the Internet, does not trust that it will be paid by after has accomplished its task. This may partially weaken the motivation of to perform the outsourcing computations.
Golle and Mironov [27] first introduced the concept of ringers to present an efficient solution to the first trust problem. With ringers, is able to ensure, with an overwhelming probability, that indeed completed its entire computation task. However, the solution itself assumes that is fully trusted by , which violates the basic requirement of outsourcing computation. Carbunar and Tripunitara [18] first addressed the second trust problem and proposed a fair conditional payments for oursourcing computation. However, the solution uses the complicated (time-consuming) cut-and-choose protocol and secret sharing scheme and thus is very inefficient for real and practical applications. Recently, Carbunar and Tripunitara [19] proposed a new fair payment scheme for outsourcing computations that can be viewed as an instance of conditional e-payments [36] . However, the solution also uses the inefficient cut-and-choose protocol.
It seems that all of the existing solutions [18] , [19] , [27] only assume the rational "lazy-but-honest" workers. That is, a "lazybut-honest" worker will try to minimize the amount of work it needs to perform in order to retrieve the payment, while it will provide the computation results to the outsourcer. This is not a reasonable assumption since and do not trust each other in the distributed computation environment. The idea of ringers can only ensure that must complete its entire computation task in order to retrieve the payment. To the best of our knowledge, it seems that the third trust problem has not received much attention in the literature: does not trust that will provide the computation results. Actually, in the both solutions [18] , [19] , can redeem the payment token from the bank even it does not send the computation results to . From the standpoint of exchange, this is unfair to and will defeat the aim of outsourcing computations. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume the rational "lazy-and-partially-dishonest" workers in the outsourcing computation model. Loosely speaking, a rational "lazy-and-partially-dishonest" worker will try to minimize the amount of work it needs to perform, and will not provide the computation results to the outsourcer except in the case where it cannot retrieve the payment token. Trivially, if a worker is not willing to send the computation results to the outsourcer at the expense of the payment, we say that it is irrational.
The third trust problem in outsourcing computations can be viewed as a special instance of fair exchange protocols: and exchange the payment token and computation results in a fair manner. Early work on fair exchange focused on the gradual release of secrets to obtain fairness [7] , [21] , [24] . However, such a solution mainly has two disadvantages. Firstly, the fairness is based on an unrealistic assumption of equal computational effort for both parties. Secondly, the protocol is very inefficient since it requires plenty of rounds of interaction between the two parties. An alternative approach to fair exchange is to use an online trusted third party [23] , [25] , [39] . However, the major disadvantage of such protocols is that the third party is always involved in the exchange and thus becomes a bottleneck. Asokan et al. [2] introduced the idea of optimistic fair exchange, where the third party is only involved in the case of dispute. This approach results in plenty of efficient fair exchange protocols [1] , [4] , [5] , [9] , [10] , [20] , [26] , [29] .
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose a new fair conditional payments for distributed outsourcing computations, where the outsourcer and the rational "lazy-and-partially-dishonest" workers do not trust each other. The proposed construction uses a third party to solve the trust problems. However, is not fully trusted and is only involved in the protocol in the exceptional case, namely in the case of dispute. Our contributions are two-folds:
1. We first introduce the third trust problem in the outsourcing computation model: The outsourcer does not trust that the rational "lazy-and-partially-dishonest" workers will provide the computation results. Besides, we propose a new conditional payment scheme that can solve all the three trust problem between the outscourcer and the workers. 2. The proposed conditional payment scheme is only based on traditional electronic cash systems. That is, the bank can issue a coin without the setting of some complicated electronic cash systems such as endorsed e-cash [13] or conditional e-cash [36] . Moreover, since neither the secret sharing/splitting scheme nor the cut-and-choose protocol is used for the generation or verification of the payment token, our solution is much more efficient than the existing ones [18] , [19] .
A. Related Work
The problem of outsourcing computations in distributed environments has been well studied in several research communities. The security model for distributed computations in a commercial environment is presented in [27] , [28] . The outsourcer distributes the work to different workers, verifies the computation result and gives the payments. Monrose et al. [31] proposed the idea of using computation proof to ensure correct worker behavior. Golle and Stubblebine [28] presented a solution to provide the result verification by duplicating computations. Szajda et al. [37] and Sarmena [34] proposed the probabilistic verification mechanisms for increasing the chance of detecting misbehavior. In the same setting, Szajda et al. [38] proposed a strategy for distributing redundant computations. Carbunar and Sion [16] proposed a solution where workers are rated for the quality of their work by a predefined number of randomly chosen witnesses.
Golle and Mironov [27] first introduced the concept of ringers to elegantly solve the trust problem of verifying computation completion for the "inversion of one-way function" class of computations. Du et al. [22] proposed a solution to this problem by requiring workers to commit to the computed values using Merkle trees. Carbunar and Tripunitara [18] firstly addressed the trust problem of retrieving payments after performing the computation and present a conditional payment scheme. However, the solution is impractical for realistic applications since it uses the inefficient secret sharing scheme and cut-and-choose protocol. Recently, Carbunar and Tripunitara [19] proposed a new fair payment for oursourced computations. Nevertheless, the solution also uses the inefficient cut-and-choose protocol. Both solutions can be viewed as using an instance of a conditional e-cash [36] . On the other hand, the solutions assume only the lazy-but-honest workers. Therefore, neither of them can solve the trust problem of obtaining the computation result from the dishonest workers.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Some preliminaries are given in Section II. The proposed efficient fair conditional payments scheme is given in Section III. The security analysis of the conditional payments scheme is given in Section IV. Finally, conclusions will be made in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce the model for outsourcing computations and then give an overview for the concept of ringers. Besides, we present the proof of knowledge for the equality of discrete logarithms and the verifiable encryption for discrete logarithms, which play an important role in generating the payment token in our scheme.
A. Model for Outsourcing Computations
We consider an outsourcing computation in which an outsourcer assigns the task of a computation to different workers. Also, the outsourcer and the workers do not trust each other. Specifically, we assume the rational "lazy-and-partially-dishonest" workers in the outsourcing computation. Formally, such a computation is defined as follows [27] :
• A job . The task of the job is to evaluate a function on the finite domain , where , and is a set of values of interest for an outsourcer . A worker needs to compute for all and return those values such that .
• A payment scheme . The payment can be thought of an electronic payment token (for example, an electronic cash) that is issued by a bank .
• A screener . The screener is typically implemented as a program that takes as input a pair for , and a payment scheme . The output of is a string . The intent behind is to identify "valuable" output of , either for (solutions for the job ) or for (values that aid in retrieving the payment associated with the job). There are the following four stages in the model of outsourcing computations.
• Initialization: The outsourcer prepares the outsourcing instance and the payment , and then sends to the worker .
• Verification:
validates to gain assurance that it will be paid once it completes the job.
• Computation and Payment: For each input computes and uses the screener to find such that , which is returned to . Besides, uses the screener to derive its payment.
• Cancellation/Spending: If cannot finish the job before the deadline, can cancel the payment or spend it to others.
B. Ringers
The idea of "ringers", first introduced by Golle and Mironov [27] , can be used to solve the problem of the trust in . That is, needs to be convinced that does indeed perform all the computations that were outsourced to him. A ringer is a value chosen by according to the target of . There are two kinds of ringers, true ringers and bogus ringers. A true ringer is such that (recall that is the domain of the function to be computed by ), and a bogus ringer is such that . If honestly does its work, then what it sends at the end is the set of true ringers, and possibly the special preimage for which is looking. The ringers ensure that does its entire work. The bogus ringers makes it more difficult for to stop prematurely and still make believe that it did the entire work.
• Initialization: chooses an integer , the number of ringers. It picks a random integer to be the number of true ringers, and to be the number of bogus ringers. The distribution of in is . computes for every true and bogus ringer . These postimages are included in the screener that is sent to . The screener is used by to decide what it must store for transmission back to once it completes the job. uses this information to infer whether indeed completed the entire job.
runs a protocol with to ensure that it can retrieve the payment tokens if it completed the job.
• Computation and Payment: The screener takes as input a pair and tests whether , where is the postimage whose preimage seeks, and each is the postimage of a true or bogus ringer. If is indeed in the set, then outputs ; otherwise it outputs the empty string. computes for each element in , processes each through , collects all the outputs of and sends them to to receive its payment. Golle and Mironov [27] proved the following theorem: The bogus ringers scheme ensures a coverage constant of , where coverage constant denotes the fraction of on which must evaluate before submitting the computation for payment.
C. Knowledge Proof for the Equality of Discrete Logarithms
is a signature on message due to the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Camenisch and Michels [15] first presented a protocol to prove the equality of discrete logarithms from different groups. Let and be two distinct groups with different prime orders and , respectively. Let be a collision-resistant hash function. Let be a integer such that and be a security parameter. Let and . If lies in an interval , the prover can convince the verifier that in as follows. First the prover and the verifier engage in the (once and for all) setup phase. The verifier randomly chooses two sufficiently large safe primes and , and computes . The verifier also chooses two random elements and from , sends the prover and , and proves that indeed is the product of two safe primes. The prover checks whether and to convince that has large order, where . Then the prover randomly chooses and , computes (in ), and (in ). The prover sends the verifier and the verifier accepts if and only if and .
D. Verifiable Encryption for Discrete Logarithms
The concept of verifiable encryption was first introduced by Stadler [35] in the context of publicly verifiable secret sharing schemes. Asokan et al. [4] extended the notion in a more general form for fair exchange and then Camenisch et al. [11] presented a formal definition for verifiable encryption.
Suppose Alice and Bob agree on a common value , where is a generator in a cyclic group . Alice wants to generate a verifiable encryption for under the public key of a trusted third party . Trivially, we assume that it is intractable to compute from in . Ateniese [1] presented a simple method of verifiable encryption for discrete logarithms as follows.
Consider the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem [32] , let be an RSA modulus which is generated by along with a small integer . Let be a square-free odd -smooth integer such that it divides and is prime to (a suggested size is ). Let be an element whose multiplicative order modulo is a large multiple of . A message is encrypted by . Decryption is performed using the prime factors of , getting by the Chinese remainder theorem: Let be the prime factors of . Given the ciphertext , compute , where can be computed by the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [33] . Using the Chinese remainder theorem, can obtain the message easily.
The verifiable encryption of , given , is performed by computing and showing that with the knowledge proof for the equality of discrete logarithms from different groups. For ease of notation, we denote by the encryption of a discrete logarithm for under the public key of a third party throughout the whole paper, where such that and . For more details, please refer to Section II-C.
III. EFFICIENT FAIR CONDITIONAL PAYMENTS
A. Security Model
In this section, we present an efficient fair conditional payment scheme. There are four participants in our scheme, an outsourcer , a worker , a bank , and a third party . Without loss of generality, let be a generic account-holder of , and can issue an electronic coin efficiently with a traditional electronic cash system ( requires neither the setting of conditional e-cash, nor the inefficient cut-and-choose protocol to generate the payment token in our solution). In the normal case, and fairly exchange the computation result and the payment token. In the case of disputes, is involved in the protocol to ensure the fairness of the payments. We assume that is not fully trusted, and may collude with one party to obtain profits at the expense of the other party. Actually, just acts as a server in our proposed payments: it receives a request from or , updates its internal state and sends a response.
Similar to [3] , [4] , we assume that the communication channel between any two participants is resilient. The resilient channel assumption leads to an asynchronous communication model without global clocks, where messages can be delayed arbitrarily but with finite amount of time. In order to avoid the disputes, the deadline to finish the outsourcing computation task should include the time to be delayed in the communication channel.
The security properties of the proposed payments for outsourcing computations are defined in term of completeness, fairness, accountability.
• Completeness: It is infeasible for the adversary to prevent honest and from successfully obtaining the computation results and the payment token, respectively. The adversary can interact with , but cannot interfere with the interaction of and , except insofar as the adversary still has the power to schedule the messages from and to .
• Fairness: We consider a game between an adversary and an honest party. Generally, we let the adversary play the role of the corrupt party, who completely controls the network, arbitrarily interacts with , and arbitrarily delays the honest party's requests to . In this sense, the fairness means that it is infeasible for the adversary (or ) to obtain the computation results (or the payment token), while without allowing the honest party (or ) to obtain the payment token (or the computation results).
• Accountability: must be accountable for his dishonest actions, i.e., it can be detected and proven if misbehaves.
B. Main Idea
As mentioned earlier, the third trust problem in outsourcing computations is how and exchange the payment token and the computation results in a fair and efficient manner. We follow the paradigm of optimistic fair exchange and introduce a semitrusted third party in our proposed scheme. In the normal case, only and perform the protocol. In case of disputes, is involved in the so-called or protocols (either of them but not both). Compared with the traditional optimistic fair exchange protocols, the main difference is that the (resp., ) protocol can be executed only when the current time exceeds (resp., falls below) the deadline (not at any stage of the protocols).
On the other hand, a major difficulty in the fair payment scheme for outsourcing computations is how to generate the payment token efficiently. We use Brand's electronic cash system [8] for payment generation. The main trick is to encrypt partial information (e.g., in our construction) of the e-cash by using the verifiable encryption of discrete logarithms (VEDL). Note that VEDL consist of a (non-interactive) proof of knowledge for can verify the validity of the payment token (while cannot retrieve the token). Only when obtains the computation results, could retrieve the payment token from . Besides, neither the secret sharing/splitting scheme nor the cut-and-choose protocol is used for the generation or verification of the payment token. Hence, it is clear that our solution outperforms the existing schemes [18] , [19] in terms of efficiency. The reasons are two folds: Firstly, the payment token is split into shares to ensure their validity by using the cut-and-choose protocol in [18] , [19] , where is the number of ringers. Therefore, the computation complexity for payment generation and verification is . However, the computation complexity of our scheme is only . Secondly, the cut-and-choose protocol is interactive and thus it requires at least 3 round of communications for payment verification, while VEDL is noninteractive and requires only 1 round of communications.
C. The Proposed Fair Conditional Payments
In this section, we present an efficient fair conditional payment scheme. We first present some notations before presenting our solution in detail. Denote by the signature on message with the secret key of the party ; Denote by the encryption of for under the public key of as defined in Section II-D.
• Initialization: The outsourcer prepares the outsourcing instance and the payment , and then sends to the worker . -: generates an instance of a job , where , and . Assume that is the deadline to finish the job. firstly chooses an integer , the total number of ringers. Moreover, picks a random integer to be the number of true ringers. Trivially, is the number of bogus ringers. The distribution of in is . computes for every true and bogus ringer . Let , where is the postimage whose preimage seeks.
is included in the screener that is sent to . -: We will use Brand's electronic cash system [8] for payment generation. Let be a random generator tuple of the group with the prime order . The secret/public key pair of is . Define two collision-resistant hash functions , and . When opens an account at requests to identify himself. then generates at random a number , and computes the unique account number . If , then transmits to , and keeps secret. computes and sends to . Also, stores the identifying information of in the account database, together with . The information enables to uniquely identify in case he double-spends. When wants to withdraw a coin, he first proves ownership of his account. To this end, the following withdrawal protocol between and is performed: 1) generates a random number , and sends , and to . is a valid verifiable encryption of accepts the payment token. In the following, we use the abbreviated notation instead of for simplicity.
• Computation: For each input computes and then uses the screener to output if . Let the set of all elements be .
• Payment: and are involved in a protocol to exchange and the payment token in a fair manner. The protocol consists of three subprotocols:
, and . In the normal case, only the protocol is executed. , and to an intended shop (Specially, if also acts as the role of , then the payment token is canceled as [18] ). Remark 1: The proposed scheme is not based on some specific e-cash systems such as a conditional e-cash [17] , [36] , but a traditional e-cash system. The main distinctions between traditional and conditional e-cash are given in [6] : Firstly, a payer can anonymously transfer an e-coin to an anonymous payee in conditional payments. However, in traditional e-cash systems, the coin is normally bound to the identity of the merchant during the spending. Trivially, note that in our scheme, hence the payment token is bound to the identity of . Secondly, in conditional e-cash systems, a payer should have the ability to cash back the payment in case of an unfavorable outcome of the condition to the payee (the anonymity of the payer cannot be ensured since the bank credits the account of the payer), while in traditional e-cash systems, the only way to (anonymously) spend a coin is to through a merchant. Nevertheless, in our scheme, a payee can either spend the coin through a merchant or cash back the payment in an indistinguishable way. In the Payment procedure, we introduced a semitrusted third-party . This is different from [18] , [19] . However, we argue that is involved in the protocol only in the case of disputes and it is essential to solve the third trust problem. Besides, in the protocol, needs to verify the validity of the solution . Since sends to and is the abbreviated notation of clearly knows what the computation task and the screener are and cannot provide a different set to fool . Besides, (as same as ) can efficiently verify the validity of . Remark 4: Blanton [6] proposed an improved conditional e-cash based on CL-signature with protocols [12] and verifiable encryptions [11] , which does not require the expensive cut-andchoose protocol and thus is more efficient than the scheme [36] . Besides, the scheme [6] assumes that the publisher (i.e., the third party) is trusted to correctly publish the outcome of the event and any other information associated with it. Therefore, it does not consider the case that the dishonest publisher may collude with the payer or payee. On the other hand, our solution uses the e-cash system based on blind signatures, while the scheme [6] uses the e-cash system based on CL-signature with protocols and thus requires some additional proofs of knowledge in the conditional transfer stage.
Remark 5: The above solution cannot ensure the full anonymity of since the signature on is given to in the protocol. We propose an improved protocol to achieve the anonymity as follows: 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the security analysis of the proposed fair conditional payments. As mentioned before, we assume that the outsourcer and the rational "lazy-and-partiallydishonest" worker do not trust each other. Besides, we assume that the third party is not fully trusted and may collude with or .
Theorem 4.1: The proposed conditional payments satisfies the property of completeness.
Proof: If both and are honest, they will successfully perform the protocol and then obtain and the payment token (note that actually obtains the value of the payment token), respectively.
Theorem 4.2:
The proposed conditional payments satisfies the property of fairness.
Proof: We first prove the fairness for . Let us consider the game that an honest is playing against a dishonest . We say that wins the game if and only if obtains the payment token while does not obtain before . Assume that does not obtain before , then cannot obtain the payment token from . Therefore, must successfully run the protocol with in order to obtain the payment token. However, can also obtain from and this deduces a contradiction.
Therefore, the successful probability for to win the game is negligible. We then prove the fairness for . Consider an honest playing against a dishonest . We say that wins the game if and only if obtains before while does not obtain the payment token. Similarly, we assume that does not obtain the payment token from . If does not complete the entire job before , then cannot obtain either. Otherwise, can successfully run the protocol and obtain the payment token from , which contradicts the assumption. Therefore, the successful probability for to win the game is negligible.
Theorem 4.3:
The proposed conditional payments satisfies the property of accountability.
Proof: Suppose that performs the protocol with and cannot sends the computation results before . There are two cases for this event: 1.
does not complete the computation task before and colludes with ; 2. sends to while does not send it to . In any case, must perform the protocol to obtain the abort token from . This means that can successfully cancel or spend the payment token. If the double-spending is detected, can provide the abort token while cannot provide the signature of for . Then, can deduce that misbehaves since both and protocols are successfully performed by . As a result, the equal amount of the e-cash is decreased in the account of .
Theorem 4.4:
The proposed conditional payments can solve all the three trust problems.
Proof: Firstly, due to the idea of ringers, the probability for to obtain the without completing the entire computation task is negligible. Secondly, can undoubtedly obtain the payment token after he sends to or . Finally, can cancel or spend the payment token if he cannot obtain the before . Therefore, all the three trust problems can be solved.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first assume the rational lazy-and-partiallydishonest workers in the distributed outsourcing computations, and introduce a new trust problem of obtaining the computation result from the dishonest workers. Moreover, we propose a new fair conditional payment scheme that can solve all the trust problems between the outsourcer and the workers. Compared with the existing solutions [18] , [19] , the proposed solution is much more efficient for real applications since neither the secret sharing/splitting scheme nor the cut-and-choose protocol is used for the generation or verification of the payment token.
